Bloggers were able to get a hands-on the DRE and OMR machines that will be used during the ARMM elections yesterday.
I asked some details on the specifications, implementation, tests and processes, unfortunately not all were answered due to vendors usual notion of security - systems are more secured if few people know how they work. A very different view from open source advocates and developers.
We'll be writing a more detailed post soon.
On the DRE machine, a big loophole also exists. I asked the CIO of the DRE vendor on what links the printed "ballot" (like an atm receipt) to the data stored on the DRE's flash storage. it seems that no such identifier exists (as far a i can understand his explanation). This means that the printed audit which will be put on the ballot boxes by the voters is useless during audits if data are compromised on the machine.
Thus, the DRE machines can not be audited during questionable results.
This feature is very basic (common sense, in fact) and should be the first to be asked during the evaluation.
I asked some details on the specifications, implementation, tests and processes, unfortunately not all were answered due to vendors usual notion of security - systems are more secured if few people know how they work. A very different view from open source advocates and developers.
We'll be writing a more detailed post soon.
On the DRE machine, a big loophole also exists. I asked the CIO of the DRE vendor on what links the printed "ballot" (like an atm receipt) to the data stored on the DRE's flash storage. it seems that no such identifier exists (as far a i can understand his explanation). This means that the printed audit which will be put on the ballot boxes by the voters is useless during audits if data are compromised on the machine.
Thus, the DRE machines can not be audited during questionable results.
This feature is very basic (common sense, in fact) and should be the first to be asked during the evaluation.
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